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Abstract
This study estimates the effects of agricultural credit, especially a fertilizer loan, by utilizing
original survey data collected before and after the policy change. We apply the fixed-effects
method to account for the endogeneity that occurs when the farmer￿fs specific unobserved
heterogeneity correlates with the amount of loan. The result indicates that the quantitative
effects of a fertilizer loan on dry-season rice cultivated areas (DRCAs) are small. This
suggests that the elimination of the fertilizer loan may have little effect on DRCAs.
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The estimation of the effects of agricultural credit becomes an important indicator for 
evaluating an antipoverty strategy. In many developing countries, including Laos, farm 
households receive subsidized interest rate loans, one of the direct credit policies to improve 
the credit access of rural households. However, since the 1970s, this policy has been strongly 
criticized as not being an appropriate policy to encourage formal financial institutions to 
provide the needed financial services to poor rural households. Critics argue that it may 
reduce, rather than improve, the credit access of rural households because of the high 
transaction costs for supplying a small loan amount to a large number of borrowers (Sial and 
Carter 1996). Thus, many developing countries, including Laos, have considered adopting 
financial liberalization by emphasizing savings and the flexibility of interest rates. 
The important question is whether the adoption of financial liberalization policies is a 
significant alternative to correct for the failure of traditional agricultural credit policies, if 
poor rural households in most developing countries remain too poor to accumulate savings 
and to pay higher interest rates. For example, in the Philippines, policy-based loan programs 
continue to be implemented, although there is the adoption of market-oriented finance 
(Izumida 2001). Therefore, the effects of agricultural credit need to be seriously studied, to 
understand the problems and feasibility of switching from traditional agricultural finance to 
market-oriented finance. The adoption of market-oriented finance, which leads to the 
elimination of subsidized loan programs, may produce a negative effect on poor rural 
households, if the effects of such loans show a significantly positive effect on households’ 
outcomes or agricultural production. 
This paper focuses on the dry-season cultivated area as opposed to the rainy season. The 
reason for this focus is because through policies of promoting self-sufficiency in rice 
production and increase in production, the government has encouraged farm households to 
cultivate rice in the dry season rather than only cultivate in the rainy season. The yield of rice 
production is higher, about 4–4.5 tons per hectare, in the dry season compared with about 3–
3.5 tons per hectare in the rainy season. 
Since there are no direct subsidies to farm households, the Agricultural Promotion Bank 
(APB), the only formal financial institution that provides loans to farm households under 
government supervision and subsidies, becomes a major supporter to promote dry-season 
cultivation through the loan programs. APB provides loans in the form of cash and fertilizer. 
Fertilizer loans are provided in unit bags of 50–60 kg per season and repaid either by cash or 
rice production after harvesting. 
However, because of reductions of government subsidies and financial structural reform of 
the APB that emphasizes commercial finance, the APB decided in 2004 to end the policy of 
providing fertilizer loans. Without the fertilizer loans, farm households may be discouraged 
from cultivating in the dry season and this may lead to a decline in the total dry-season rice 
cultivated areas. Without fertilizers, dry-season cultivation is impossible as rice yield is only 
2.1 to 2.5 t/ha, which creates a financial deficit to farmers. Moreover, most farm households 
undertake insufficient capital investment to obtain the higher-priced fertilizer from the market. 
Under this situation, we suspect that the APB’s cessation of fertilizer loans may have 
contributed to the decline in the area of dry-season rice cultivation. 
The evidence shows that the aggregate of dry-season cultivated areas has rapidly declined 
after the policy change from 81.36 thousand ha in 2003 to 61 thousand ha in 2005 (Table I). 
Therefore, a thorough study of the effects of fertilizer loans on dry-season cultivated areas is 
necessary to examine the effect of the policy change. Whether the change in such a policy 
would affect the dry-season cultivated area depends on the magnitude of the effects of 
fertilizer loans on dry-season cultivated areas. 
  1The main obstacle in estimating such effects is the endogeneity of loans. This identification 
problem can be solved by applying alternative identification strategies. Previous studies such 
as Feder et al. (1990), Sial and Carter (1996), Duong and Izumida (2002), and Carter (1989) 
estimate the effects of agricultural credit by applying an endogenous switching regression 
model in order to account for the heterogeneity among borrowers and nonborrowers or credit-
constrained and nonconstrained households. These studies, with the exception of Carter 
(1989), found that the credit factor has significantly positive effects on agricultural production 
in China, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Carter (1989), however, found that the effect of credit 
support on small farm production is weak in Nicaragua. 
The endogenous switching regressions model, however, does not account for farmer-
specific unobserved heterogeneity, which is expected to correlate strongly with the loan 
amount. Therefore, our paper attempts to account for farmer-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity by using fixed-effects estimation and original survey data collected before and 
after the policy change. The results show the small quantitative effects of fertilizer loans on 
dry-season rice cultivated areas. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric 
framework; section 3 presents the survey design and data characteristics; section 4 discusses 
estimate results; and section 5 summarizes and discusses the implications of the results. 
2.  Econometric Framework 
The purpose of the study is to estimate the effects of agricultural credit, especially fertilizer 
loans, on the dry-season rice cultivated areas (DRCAs) by taking farmer-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity into account. The simple model of the DRCAs can be written as follows: 
it i it it it it X CL FL DRCA ε α β β β β + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 , (1) 
where DRCAit is the amount of dry-season cultivated areas of farm households i at time period 
t, FLit is an amount of fertilizer loans made to farm households i at time period t, CLit is the 
amount of cash loans made to farm households i at time period t, 1 β  and  2 β  are estimated 
parameters that measure the effect of the fertilizer loans (FL) and cash loans (CL) respectively, 
and Xit represents other explanatory variables of interest for farm households i at time period t, 
including family labor, farmer experience, female head of household, and dummy variables 
for irrigation areas. In the sample area, irrigation areas are classified into three zones: 
upstream, middle-stream and downstream. These dummy variables estimate the effect of 
irrigated water used during the dry-season cultivation.  i α  is the farmer-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity affecting the dry-season cultivated area, and  it ε  is an error term. 
Equation (1) is estimated by applying the fixed-effects estimation, and for comparison, the 
simple OLS is also estimated. OLS relies on the restrictive exogeneity assumption that the 
compound of error term ( it ε ) and farmer-specific unobserved heterogeneity ( i α ) are not 
correlated with other explanatory variables,  [ ] 0 , , | = + it it it it i X CL FL E ε α . However, this 
assumption is violated because at least farmer-specific unobserved heterogeneity ( i α ) is 
expected to correlate highly with fertilizer and cash loans. For example, a highly able or 
productive farmer (high value of  i α ) would increase the amount of fertilizer and cash loans 
made. As a result, OLS suffers from the omitted variable bias. 
The alternative method is to use fixed-effects estimation to control for farmer-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity. The fixed-effects estimation assumes that the error term ( it ε ) is not 
correlated with other explanatory variables and the farmer-specific unobserved heterogeneity 
  2( i α ), [ 0 , , , | = i it it it it X CL FL E ] α ε . Rather than taking the difference of equation (1) to 
eliminate  i α , the method directly controls for  i α  by generating a set of dummy variables for 
each farm household, and each dummy variable indicates the farmer-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity
1. Then equation (1) becomes: 
it i it it it it Dummy X CL FL DRCA ε β β β β + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 . (1a) 
The coefficient of the dummy variable for farmer i gives the estimation for  i α . The study 
further assumes that  it ε  is independent from  1 − it ε , which means that  it ε  is uncorrelated over 
time, with 0 ) , cov( 1 = − it it ε ε . In other words, last year’s positive or negative shock on DRCAs 
does not affect this year’s DRCAs
2. 
3.  Data 
The original data were collected by conducting a two-stage field survey. The first stage 
was to select, at random, two districts from each Vientiane municipality and Vientiane 
province in the central region, and one district from the Savannakhet province in the southern 
region. The basic information was collected from the District Agricultural Offices (DAOs) of 
sample districts. Then, 21 villages were randomly selected from these sample districts. The 
heads of villages were interviewed to obtain the basic data such as number of cultivated 
households, amount of annual cultivated areas, agricultural activity and financial services. 
The second stage involved interviews with the sample farm households, which were 
randomly selected from sample villages
3. Data for 2003 (before the policy change) and for 
2005 (after changing the policy) were collected. Those interviewed included farm households 
who had applied for fertilizer and cash loans, as well as those who had not. Borrower farm 
households included households who borrowed from formal and/or semiformal financial 
institutions, and/or informal financial services. The numbers of farm households interviewed 
from Vientiane municipality, Vientiane province, and Savannakhet province were 345, 450, 
and 303, respectively. 
4.  Estimate Results 
Means and standard deviations of some major variables are reported in Table II. For 
comparison, the statistics before and after the policy change are presented. The mean of the 
dry-season rice cultivated areas (DRCAs) significantly declined after the change in policy, 
though the difference is small, only 0.5 rai (0.08 ha) on average. The correlation coefficient 
between the fertilizer loan and DRCAs is also positive: 0.1903. This suggests that the 
elimination of fertilizer loans may affect the DRCAs negatively. 
Estimating the effects of fertilizer loans on DRCAs is necessary to identify whether the 
policy change affects DRCAs. For comparison, both the OLS and fixed-effects estimated 
results are reported in Table III. Although these two methods show a positive effect of 
fertilizer loans on DRCAs, the quantitative effects of fertilizer loans differ remarkably 
between the two methods. The OLS estimate of the effect of fertilizer loans is 0.191 (with a 
                                                 
1 Equation (1a) contains 1,098 dummy variables of farm households. 
2 There are many empirical studies that have tried to solve the problem of last year’s positive or negative shock 
on this year’s dependent variable by including the last year Yit–1 variable into a model. However, this solution not 
only is unable to solve the problem from bias estimation but even makes the bias become larger (Nickell 1981). 
3 The survey excludes farm households who could not survive after the policy change. Therefore, although the 
percentage of these households is small (about 2%), this exclusion may cause sample selection bias. 
  3standard error of 0.023), while this effect decreases to approximately 0.044 (with a standard 
error of 0.025) in the fixed-effects estimation. 
One possible explanation for the overestimation in the OLS is that the OLS estimate not 
only contains the effect of fertilizer loans but also confounds the effect of farmer-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity correlating with fertilizer loans. This reflects the omitted variable 
bias in the OLS estimate. Therefore, after accounting for farmer-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity, the impact of fertilizer loans becomes small. Although the fixed-effects 
estimate shows a statistically significant positive effect of the fertilizer loans on the DCAs, 
the quantitative effect is small. One additional bag of fertilizer loan (about 50–60 kg) would 
increase the DRCAs only 0.044 rai (0.007 ha or 0.017 acre). 
In the case of the cash loans, the OLS estimate shows a significant positive effect of the 
cash loans on DRCAs, while the fixed-effects estimate is insignificant. The reason may be 
that cash loans may have no effect on the DRCAs because farm households may not directly 
spend cash loans on cultivating rice in the dry season. For instance, they may spend the cash 
loans on food for laborers or other household items during the cultivated season. Another 
reason is that although the correlation between cash loans and farmer-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity is accounted for in the fixed-effects estimation, the correlation between cash 
loans and productive shock may occur, thereby generating an inconsistent estimate. 
Other explanatory variables, except family labor stock (the number of adults who work in 
the field) and the middle-stream zone, are statistically insignificant. Family labor stock has a 
positive effect on the DRCAs. Generally the family labor stock is the primary labor force for 
cultivation in rural areas, especially in the sample areas. Adding one more family labor stock 
would significantly increase the DRCAs by about 1 rai or 0.16 ha (0.395 acre). The dummy 
variable of irrigated water, middle-stream zone, shows a significant positive effect on the 
DCA because there is a sufficient amount of irrigated water in this zone. 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
This study estimates the effects of fertilizer on the DRCAs by using original data collected 
before and after the policy change. Our study utilizes the fixed-effects estimation to account 
for the farmer-specific unobserved heterogeneity. The result shows only a weak support for 
the hypothesis that the fertilizer loan had a positive effect on the DRCA. 
By comparing OLS and fixed-effects estimates, we establish the importance of controlling 
for farmer-specific unobserved heterogeneity, which affects the amount of the loan. The 
results of the OLS and fixed-effects estimates are remarkably different. The OLS estimate of 
the effect of the fertilizer loan on the DRCAs is greater than the fixed-effects estimate. This 
result indicates that the omitted variable bias may occur in the case of the OLS estimates. 
Such evidence reflects the fact that small numbers of productive farm households receive a 
loan from the formal financial institution, the APB, while a large number of unproductive 
farm households may be excluded from the formal financial services. Therefore, unlike poor 
farm households, these productive farm households can obtain the fertilizer input from the 
market, even without the APB’s fertilizer loan. 
Because of the small quantitative effect of fertilizer loans on the DRCAs, which would 
increase the DRCAs only by 0.007 ha or 0.017 acre, the elimination of fertilizer loans may 
have little effect on the DRCA. This implies that although the fertilizer loan is provided to 
farm households, it provides inadequate support for farm households to cultivate rice in the 
dry season. Therefore, the elimination of the policy of the fertilizer loan to farm households 
may be a significant way for the APB to introduce market-oriented finance to the agricultural 
sector gradually rather than completely eliminating all subsidized loan programs. 
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  5Table I: Aggregate dry-season rice cultivated areas, 1976–2005 































Source: Basic Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 
 
Table II. Mean and standard deviation of the major variables 
All  Before policy change After policy change Variable 




Number of family members 
Number of dependents 
Farmer experience (years) 
Number of family laborers 
Hired labor 
Dry-season cultivated area (rai)
a
Rainy-season cultivated area (rai)
b
Total cultivated area (rai)
c
Amount of rental farmland (rai) 
Amount of cash loan (Kip) 










































































































Note: 1 ha = 6.25 rai. 1US$ = 10,281 kip (Vientiane Times March 28
th, 2006). 1 bag = 50–60 kg 
Upstream, middle-stream, and downstream are dummy variables used to control for irrigated water. 
a, b, and c are the cultivated areas of rice production. 
  6Table III: Estimation of the effect of a fertilizer loan on dry-season rice cultivated areas 
Dependent variable: dry-season rice cultivated areas 
Explanatory variables  OLS  Fixed-effects estimator 
Intercept 
Fertilizer loans (bag) 
Cash loans (‘000 Kip) 
Family labor 


















































F(1101, 1089) = 4.47 
0.8188 
0.6356 
Note: 1 ha = 6.25 rai; 1US$ = 10,281 kip (Vientiane Times March 28
th, 2006). 1 bag = 50–60 kg. 
Upstream zone is dropped from estimation as a reference group. Results of farm household dummies are not 
reported in the Table. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* ** *** Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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